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Self-Regulation: How It Works 
R. K. Mautz* 
University of Michigan 
Member, Public Oversight Board 
So that the academics in the audience may have some understanding of the 
impact of the peer review process when it was rather suddenly self-imposed on 
the accounting profession, I suggest you stretch your imaginations and 
consider the following analogy to the peer review process as if it were a reality. 
An Analogy to the Peer Review Program 
Every three years, your department must engage an accounting depart-
ment from another school, or an AAA appointed team, to review your 
department's quality control system. In preparation for that review, you must 
first file a quality control document that includes: 
1. Factual information about the size of your department, students, and 
faculty. 
2. A statement of the goals of your department and how these 
reconcile with and are supported by the goals of the college and 
university. 
3. Your department's policies and practices with respect to: 
a. Recruiting faculty and students. 
b. Faculty promotions, pay, and allocations of other re-
sources. 
c. Content of course outlines. 
d. Selection of textbooks, including provisions for avoiding 
any conflicts of interest. 
e. Grading practices and provisions for faculty evaluation. 
f. Nature, extent, cost, and relevance of research activities 
of faculty members. 
g. Allocation of committee activities and extent of academic 
community service. 
h. Nature and extent of, and rewards for, professional 
service. 
i. Nature and extent of faculty consulting, its relationship to 
department goals, and controls exercised to prevent 
excessive consulting. 
The purpose of the independent review of your department by your peers 
is to determine whether these policies and practices provide reasonable 
* These remarks represent my personal views and are not offered as necessarily representive of 
any official position of the Public Oversight Board. 
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assurance of quality performance by your department from the standpoint of 
the students and others who rely upon it. The review will also determine the 
extent to which members of your faculty actually comply with those policies 
and procedures and with any regulations imposed by your college, university, 
regents, or other authorities. 
In performing the review, the review team will visit classes, review syllabi, 
meet with faculty members and students, examine any policy manuals or 
handbooks used within your department or university, read examinations and 
test the grading thereof, read faculty-authored publications, and take such 
other steps as it considers necessary to form an opinion on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of your quality control system. 
The review team's conclusions will be expressed in a formal opinion 
supplemented by a letter of comment noting ways in which your system of 
quality control might be improved. This report and letter of comments will be 
placed in a public file open to your dean, students, their parents, alumni, and 
anyone else interested. 
You will pay for the review at standard consulting rates and from your own 
departmental budget. You may or may not have an opportunity to make similar 
reviews of other departments. No reciprocal reviews are permitted. 
This is at least a rough analogy to the peer review program adopted by the 
AICPA—with what some members thought was excesssive haste. The 
leadership of the profession both believed in what they were imposing upon 
their own and other firms and also felt that they had no viable alternative. The 
practitioners who had little or nothing to do with the big decisions but whose 
lives and pocketbooks were directly affected by those decisions did not 
welcome the results with great enthusiasm. 
The Nature of Professional Regulation 
Discussing professional regulation with you involves two difficulties. First, 
it is still developing so that there is no way to bring you the final word, if there 
ever will be one. Second, our time is limited and the subject is complex. Hence, 
I can give you no more than a summary treatment of the subject. 
You may find it helpful to think of professional regulation in terms of one 
goal, two approaches, and three levels. 
Stated in simple terms, the goal is to protect the public against audit and 
accounting failures. 
The two approaches are punishment and education. Some believe strongly 
that the greatest incentive to quality work is the sure knowledge that failure to 
comply with standards is prompt and appropriate punishment. Almost every-
one believes that there are at least some cases in which punishment is 
appropriate and that punishing the wrongdoer does, indeed, have some 
deterrent effect on those who otherwise might be tempted to indulge in the 
same improper practice. 
Others believe that education is the best possibility for improvement of 
professional performance. They hold that as many practitioners as possible 
should be educated to the existence of standards and how to meet them in the 
belief that most practitioners, indeed most people, desire to perform well. As 
you might surmise, a combination of these two approaches provides the best 
hope of adequate performance. 
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These two approaches are closely related to the three levels of regulation. 
Taking a broad view of professional regulation, one finds it applied by three 
authorities. Public regulation is applied by governmental bodies or agencies, is 
directed at punishing those who fall below minimum acceptable behavior, and 
has the full authority and power of the state for enforcement purposes. Most 
governmental regulation is concerned with conformity with legally established 
rules and regulations or with alleged breach of contract. In this country and 
many others, the government provides rules of discovery, subpoena, judicial 
review, appeal, and other measures intended to assure equitable treatment for 
both parties to any dispute. Punishment or damages that shift resources from 
one party to another may result. 
Peer regulation is performed through professional organizations which do 
not have either the power or authority of government. Their primary activity is 
to establish professional standards—such as generally accepted auditing stand-
ards, generally accepted accounting principles, standards of quality control, and 
rules of ethics—and to encourage members to accept and comply with them. 
The most that voluntary organizations can do in the way of punishment or 
enforcement is to censure or expel nonconforming members. Those who do 
not wish to comply either do not join the organization or drop out in protest 
against requirements they believe to be improper. Thus, peer regulation is a 
voluntary matter. 
Private regulation occurs within firms, to some extent within every firm, 
and, therefore, is the most pervasive form of regulation. The motivation is 
based on professional pride and enlightened self-interest. If a firm is to remain 
competitive, it cannot tolerate incompetent, careless, or untrustworthy em-
ployees. Furthermore, these are the kinds of employees most likely to make 
the mistakes that lead to litigation, a very undesirable event. 
Management of a firm does not have the authority or power of government, 
but it is far more powerful than a professional organization. The power to 
terminate employment is a strong one just as is the power to reward excellent 
performance both financially and with promotions into new opportunities. 
These options make private regulation extremely important in the overall 
regulatory process. 
Neither of the two approaches and no one of the three levels of regulation is 
sufficient by itself. If a profession is to be well regulated, public, professional, 
and private regulation must all be employed, most desirably with some degree 
of coordination and cooperation. Each of them has the potential for, and usually 
employs, both punishment and education to some extent, but public regulation 
tends to stress punishment whereas peer and private regulation emphasize 
education. 
The AICPA's Self-Regulatory Program 
Until 1977, the AICPA had been an organization offering personal member-
ships only. No provision of any kind was made for membership or activity by 
firms. Under pressure from Congress, in that year the AICPA made a rather 
remarkable change in its organization. It established a division for firms 
consisting of two sections, a Private Companies Practice Section and an SEC 
Practice Section. Any firm could join either or both of these sections. 
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Each section is governed by an executive committee appointed by the 
AICPA chairman with the approval of the AICPA Board of Directors. My 
discussion is concerned only with the SEC Practice Section. 
Serving under the executive committee are a peer review committee and a 
special investigations committee which are responsible for much of the work of 
the section. A Public Oversight Board (POB) of five members has been 
established to represent the public interest and to monitor the work of the 
section. It has no line authority, serving only in an oversight and advisory role. 
It does have considerable influence. 
The original POB was chaired by Mr. John McCloy, a man of very broad 
experience and great public service. Included in the membership were Arthur 
Woods and John Harper, retired chief executive officers of Sears and Alcoa, 
respectively, and Ray Garrett and William Carey, both former SEC chairmen. 
Both Mr. Garrett and Mr. Carey have since died, and Mr. McCloy resigned 
very recently. Al Sommers, formerly a member of the SEC, has been added to 
the Board's membership, and I was added earlier as the first and so far the only 
accountant on the Board. It has been a very interesting assignment. 
The Peer Review Process 
Under the supervision of the executive committee, the peer review 
committee and the special investigations committee direct most of the work of 
the section. Peer review is the heart of the self-regulatory program. It consists 
of a quality compliance review of each member firm every three years to be 
performed by peers; that is, by partners and managers from other firms. 
A quality compliance review is based on a set of standards that cover all 
aspects of a firm's accounting and auditing services. Nine elements of quality 
control have been identified. These are: 
• Independence 




• Professional development 
• Advancement 
• Acceptance and continuation of clients 
• Inspection 
The section's Peer Review Manual explains the nature and scope of each of 
these elements. The establishment of this set of quality control standards 
represents a considerable achievement. A significant part of their development 
had been accomplished by the Institute's Committee on Auditing Procedure 
before 1977 and was available for the section to develop further when the need 
arose. They now provide to member firms an indication of what is expected of 
them in the way of quality assurance and the standards against which they will 
be measured during a compliance review. 
The compliance (peer) review team may come from another firm (engaged 
by the firm to be reviewed), or it may be a team selected by the peer review 
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committee for the purpose. The firm to be reviewed makes that choice. The 
review team is headed by a team captain who directs the work and writes the 
final report. 
In preparation for a compliance review, a firm prepares a quality control 
document which describes its policies and procedures for all the nine elements 
of quality control described previously. This document is supplied to the review 
team which reviews it for adequacy and compliance with professional standards 
and, during the course of the review, considers the appropriateness of the 
described policies and procedures for the firm under review. 
In performing the review, the review team reads the firm's policy and 
procedure manuals, studies its guides and check-lists, examines the technical 
library for adequacy, selects and examines work papers from audit engage-
ments, and interviews selected people from the professional staff. The Peer 
Review Manual provides guides regarding the number of accounting and audit 
engagement hours that should be tested by the review team and the number of 
offices to be visited in a multi-office practice. 
At the conclusion of the review, the team captain discusses with his team 
members the type of report to be issued. It may be unqualified; unqualified with 
a letter of comments about ways in which the quality control policies and 
procedures of the firm can be improved; modified and accompanied by a letter 
of comments; or adverse. 
At the conclusion of every compliance review, including compliance 
reviews of each office covered in a multi-office engagement, the review team 
captain and possibly his team members meet with the management of the 
reviewed firm or office to discuss their findings and conclusions, including the 
nature of the report. When a modified report or even a report with significant 
recommendations in the letter of comments is planned, the discussion in such 
an exit conference can become heated indeed. Professional pride on the part of 
the reviewed firm is such that an adverse report, a modified report, or even 
strong comments are not well received. At the same time, the reviewers also 
take some pride in their ability to improve any system they find. Whatever 
report is finally issued, together with any letter of comments, goes into a public 
file at the AICPA offices available to anyone interested in seeing it. 
The peer review committee will accept unqualified reports without a letter 
of comments for direct filing in the public file unless it has some reason to 
question the propriety of the report. Any report accompanied by a letter of 
comments will receive the committee's attention. Its question is whether the 
comments suggest the necessity of a modified or adverse report rather than an 
unqualified or modified report, respectively. In some cases, the peer review 
committee will detail one or more of its members to discuss with the team 
captain and any others involved any reservations which it may have. It may 
even send the review team back for more work, if it feels this is necessary, or 
schedule an additional or accelerated peer review to assure that recommended 
quality control improvements are actually implemented. Once the peer review 
committee is satisfied, a majority vote then accepts the report for public file 
purposes. 
In addition to the review by the peer review committee, the staff of the 
Public Oversight Board also reviews the quality compliance review work 
papers, attends the exit conference, or reads the report and letter of 
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comments. Finally, on a sampling basis and with the identity of the audit 
engagement work papers masked, representatives of the SEC Office of the 
Chief Accountant also review the peer review work papers and report. 
The Work of the Special Investigations Committee 
As mentioned, the peer review process works on a triennial rotation basis 
and on a sampling basis for each firm. Thus, there is no way a compliance 
review can assure freedom from error. In addition, compliance review is 
concerned with the reviewed firm's system of quality control policies and 
procedures. When litigation against a member firm concerning the propriety of 
its accounting or auditing findings is initiated, there immediately exists an 
implication that the quality control system is not adequate. Of course, 
allegations in litigation proceedings are no more than allegations until actually 
tested by the legal process. Nevertheless, the possibility that they might be 
found valid raises questions about the system of quality control. 
The special investigations committee was established to inquire into such 
possibilities. Each member firm must report all litigation involving audits of 
SEC clients within 30 days. The special investigations committee then can call 
for whatever information it considers necessary to discover whether the firm's 
quality control situation is adequate or not. It typically begins by reading the 
allegations and reviewing the financial statements to which they relate. It may 
also obtain the latest peer review report and letter of comments, consult with 
members of the review team and reviewed firm, and take whatever other steps 
are necessary to determine whether the allegations indicate a significant 
weakness in the firm's quality control. 
Allegations charged in litigation may be: 
• Frivolous. 
• Made in error relative to the role and responsibility of the independ-
ent accountant. 
• Valid but the result of personnel failure rather than failure of the 
quality control system. 
• Valid and the result of a weakness in the quality control system: 
Which the firm has already corrected. 
Which still needs to be strengthened. 
In almost half the cases that are reported, the committee finds the charges 
to be frivolous or based on error. These cases are promptly closed. When it 
finds what appear to be valid allegations with the likelihood that personnel 
failure is at fault, the committee leaves the matter to public regulation which is 
much better equipped to determine responsibility and fix punishment, if any is 
called for. If the allegations appear valid and imply a significant system 
weakness, the committee will call for a special review under its direct control. 
Such a review may be directed at specific offices of the firm, at the work of 
specific individuals, or at the services performed by the firm in a given industry 
or industries as seems necessary. The approach followed is one of seeking to 
find weaknesses that may exist so they can be remedied and the public 
protected. 
If the firm management has already looked into the possibilities and taken 
the necessary action, the committee desires assurance that this has really 
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happened and then will take no further action other than to add a report to that 
effect to the public file. If nothing has been done, it will insist that the member 
firm take appropriate action. 
When notification of litigation is first received, a staff summary is prepared 
and supplied to all (nine) members of the committee. The chairman will appoint 
one or more members as a task force to direct the staff in obtaining whatever 
additional information is needed. Until the task force members are themselves 
satisfied that the case should be closed and can influence the rest of the 
committee to agree, the case will remain open. The committee's desire, of 
course, is to reach the most effective conclusion as soon as possible, an 
effective conclusion being one that provides adequate protection to the public 
without undue cost to the member firm. 
The Executive Committee 
The executive committee supervises the peer review committee and the 
special investigations committee, providing general guidance as necessary. It 
also has final authority for the imposition of sanctions. These are provided for in 
general terms within the rules and membership requirements of the section 
which are necessarily limited in scope and authority. The self-regulatory 
program in no way replaces or substitutes for either public or private 
regulation. Firms or individuals found guilty of breaking the law or of breach of 
contract will be punished by our public regulatory process. Those found guilty 
of negligence, irresponsibility, or other inadequacies are likely to be dealt with 
by their employers in a manner that seems appropriate to them in the 
circumstances. Sanctions most likely to be imposed by the executive commit-
tee would be for failure to comply with membership requirements, including 
refusal to cooperate with either the peer review or the special investigations 
committee. The executive committee also has the authority to determine 
whether sanctions should be publicized. 
Sanctions mentioned in the Peer Review Manual include: 
• Corrective measures by the firm, including consideration by the firm 
of appropriate actions with respect to individual firm personnel. 
• Additional requirements for continuing professional education. 
• Accelerated or special peer reviews. 
• Monetary fines. 
Role of the Public Oversight Board 
In its guardianship of the public interest, the POB serves in an oversight 
capacity only. It has no line authority. Members of the staff and of the Board 
attend meetings of other components of the self-regulatory process, always 
have the privilege of entering into the discussion, sometimes meet with specific 
components or their leadership for discussion purposes, and do not hesitate to 
comment either critically or constructively as necessary. Responsiveness to 
Board comments has been gratifying. 
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Conclusion 
This paper provides no more than a quick introduction to the AICPA's 
program, but there are three thoughts I hope you will take with you. First, 
over time self-regulation should have a significant effect on the quality of audit 
service provided by independent accounting firms. It is a remarkably effective 
educational device. Second, self-regulation replaces nothing; it is an addition, 
not a substitution. Public and private regulation are still in place and effective. 
All three aspects of regulation are necessary to get the job done well. Third, as 
devised and as functioning, the present program is a remarkable addition to the 
regulatory mechanism previously in existence, so far as we can determine, 
unmatched in any other profession. 
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